International Support of Climate Change Policies in Developing Countries: Strategic, Moral and Fairness Aspects

<br /> International transfers in climate policy channeled from the industrialized to the developing<br /> world either support the mitigation of climate change or the adaptation to global warming.<br /> From an allocative efficiency point of view, transfers supporting mitigation tend to be Pareto-improving<br /> whereas this is not very likely in the case of adaptation support. We illustrate this<br /> by regarding transfer schemes currently applied under the UN Framework Convention on<br /> Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto framework.<br /> However, if we enrich the analysis by integrating distributional aspects, we find that<br /> international adaptation funding may help both developing and developed world. Interestingly<br /> this is not due to altruistic incentives, but due to follow-up effects on international<br /> negotiations on climate change mitigation. We argue that the lack of fairness perceived by<br /> developing countries in the international climate policy arena can be reduced by the support<br /> of adaptation in these countries. As we show – taking into account different fairness concepts<br /> – this might raise the prospects of success in international negotiations on climate change.<br /> Yet, we find that the influence of transfers may induce different fairness effects on climate<br /> change mitigation negotiations to run counter.<br /> We discuss whether current transfer schemes under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto framework<br /> adequately serve the distributive and allocative objectives pursued in international climate<br /> policy.<br />adaptation, climate change, fairness, Global Environmental Facility, international climate policy, mitigation, reciprocity, transfers

Energy Supply and the Sustainability of Endogenous Growth

The paper provides an introduction to energy and, respective resource use within the framework of endogenous growth models. We provide an overview of different modeling approaches as well as intuition with respect to the results obtained. We consider the source problem, i.e. the supply of energy, as well as the sink problem, i.e. pollution generated by the consumption of energy resources. The introduction to the theoretical framework shortly discusses the use of neoclassical versus endogenous growth models and also points to the implications of the different types of endogenous growth approaches. We additionally give an introduction to CGE-models that include energy use and present an example of a numerical solvable model in detail. The paper closes with a look at possible future research.endogenous growth, energy, resources, pollution, CGE-models

Impacts of Climate Change on European Critical Infrastructures: The Case of the Power Sector

Anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases cause climate change and this change in turn induces various direct impacts, e.g., changes in regional weather patterns. The frequency of heat waves and droughts in Europe is likely to rise. Yet, beyond these immediate effects of climate change, there are more indirect effects: Droughts may cause water scarcity and a lack of water supply which in turn would affect further sectors and critical infrastructures. A rising lack of water supply for cooling purposes, for example, will negatively affect electricity generation in power plants. In this paper we analyse such interplays between climate-change affected sectors. We investigate whether and to which extent power generation and supply in Europe is threatened by climate change because of the higher risk of water supply shortages due to more frequent drought and heat-wave incidences. Our proposed approach cannot only be applied to analyse the climate change effects on individual power plant sites or the overall economy but also on electricity exchanges between countries.adaptation, climate change, critical infrastructures, electricity trading, energy security, nuclear power plants, vulnerability

Characteristics of Terrorism

Individual terrorist are frequently behaving seemingly absurd, e.g. by carrying out suicide operations, while activities of the terrorist organisations as a whole often seem to be conducted in a very effective way. These facts caused many researchers to regard the leaders representing the organisations like rational entities, while the followers are supposed to be just obeying and, hence, to be irrational. In this paper we offer a different approach which postulates rationality of all involved agents. We demonstrate how these agents’ behaviour could be modelled, while taking into account options of the terrorist leaders to influence their followers. From our model approaches to counter terrorism on both the leadership as well as the follower level can be derived.cognitive dissonance, joint production, Lancastrian characteristics approach, public goods, rationality, suicide attacks, terrorism

Local and Global Externalities, Environmental Policies and Growth

The paper analyzes the implications of local and global pollution when two types of abatement activities can be undertaken. One type reduces solely local pollution (e.g., use of particulate matter filters) while the other mitigates global pollution as well (e.g., application of fuel saving technologies). In the framework of a 2-country endogenous growth model, the implications of different assumptions about the degree to which global externalities are internalized are analyzed. Subsequently, we derive policy rules adapted to the different scenarios. Special attention is paid to pollution, growth and optimal policy in the case of asymmetric internalization.economic growth, global and local externalities, government policies

Decision Processes of a Suicide Bomber – Integrating Economics and Psychology

This paper provides a theoretical analysis regarding the rationality of suicide attacks from an economist’s point of view. It is argued that although a terrorist gives up future utility from consumption by committing a suicide attack, this loss can be overcompensated by the utility he derives from the attack. Some individual cases of suicide bombers are presented in order to elucidate the diversity of motivations behind the attacks. We derive conditions under which a rational agent might decide to become a suicide bomber – or to announce the attack and defect later. The paper shows why the decision to commit a suicide attack can be time-inconsistent and what mechanisms might prevent time-inconsistency. Integrating the psychological concepts of cognitive dissonance and terror management theory into our economic analysis, we demonstrate why – although predicted by standard economic theory – defection is a phenomenon rarely observed. We finally present some policy implications. In the light of our analysis, policies that focus on material well-being seem less promising than policies that address non-monetary benefits of suicide attacks. The paper concentrates on two policy strategies: offering alternatives – with respect to the aims of terrorism as well as the means to attain them – and reducing the information bias – with respect to the availability as well as the access to information.terrorism, discounting, rationality, time-consistency

Impure Public Goods and Technological Interdependencies

Impure public goods represent an important group of goods. Almost every public good exerts not only effects which are public to all but also effects which are private to the producer of this good. What is often omitted in the analysis of impure public goods is the fact that – regularly – these private effects can also be generated independently of the public good. In our analysis we focus on the effects alternative technologies – independently generating the private effects of the public good – may have on the provision of impure public goods. After the investigation in an analytical impure public good model, we numerically simulate the effects of alternative technologies in a parameterized model for climate policy in Germany.Impure public goods, Climate policy, Rationing

Private Provision of Public Goods : Incentives for Donations

In many countries the government supports individuals' and companies' donations dedicated to charity organizations or { more general { to public goods. Yet the effects of governmental support with respect to the provision of public goods has been and still is subject to an extensive debate in the economic literature. Starting from Warr's (1982, 1983) famous neutrality result an array of conditions has been identified under which this result holds or not. In this paper we examine the commonly used policy approach to subsi- dize the private provision of public goods by granting agents deductions with respect to their income or corporate tax burden. We especially take into ac- count that most income tax schemes are progressive and that deductibility is limited. The problems that arise from these specific properties of the con- sidered tax-refund schemes are pointed out first. We then turn towards the effects which such a tax-refund scheme has with respect to the provision of the public good on the one hand and individual as well as aggregate wel- fare on the other hand. We show that the effects of this commonly practised method of supporting private public good provision depend crucially on the specific properties of the progressive tax scheme and the preference structure of agents. While Pareto-improvements and even Pareto-efficiency can result from the implementation of such a scheme, it is also conceivable that at least some agents perceive a utility reduction. Due to the dependency of welfare effects on the tariff structure, income tax reforms as they are planned in many countries might not only induce a reduction in private public good provision, but might also alter the induced welfare effects.public goods, sponsoring, neutrality

Global Climate Change, Technology Transfer and Trade with Complete Specialization

The paper develops a model in which a country with better technology for abatement of Green House Gas (GHG) emission (the North) commits to an international protocol to keep the global GHG emission within a specified limit while it helps the mitigation effort in the other country (the South) with unconditional transfer of abatement technology. It finds out in the autarkic (‘no trade’) equilibrium the technology transfer offer from the North is always accepted by the South. The North may offer either a partial or a complete technology transfer. If partial technology transfer is offered it finds out the determinants of the extent of technology transfer. Then it compares the autarkic equilibrium with equilibrium where trade with complete specialization occurs and finds out that trade limits the scope of technology transfer as an instrument for mitigation of global GHG emission.GHG Emission, Mitigation, Technology Transfer, Trade

International Support of Climate Change Policies in Developing Countries: Strategic, Moral and Fairness Aspects

33 p.International transfers in climate policy channeled from the industrialized to the developing world either support the mitigation of climate change or the adaptation to global warming. From an allocative efficiency point of view, transfers supporting mitigation tend to be Pareto-improving whereas this is not very likely in the case of adaptation support. We illustrate this by regarding transfer schemes currently applied under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto framework. However, if we enrich the analysis by integrating distributional aspects, we find that international adaptation funding may help both developing and developed world. Interestingly this is not due to altruistic incentives, but due to follow-up effects on international negotiations on climate change mitigation. We argue that the lack of fairness perceived by developing countries in the international climate policy arena can be reduced by the support of adaptation in these countries. As we show – taking into account different fairness concepts – this might raise the prospects of success in international negotiations on climate change. Yet, we find that the influence of transfers may induce different fairness effects on climate change mitigation negotiations to run counter. We discuss whether current transfer schemes under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto framework adequately serve the distributive and allocative objectives pursued in international climate policy